Who Gave North Korea Nukes

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The U.S. government and the CIAPaul Joseph WatsonInfowars.com April 12, 2013 Amidst reports that North Korea now has nuclear-equipped ballistic missiles as experts warn a conflict on the Korean peninsular is more likely than not, it’s important to remember who armed North Korea with nuclear weapons in the first place – namely the U.S. government and the CIA. Image: YouTube A portion of a Defense Intelligence Agency report revealed yesterday by Rep.

Doug Lamborn of Colorado states the DIA is moderately confident that, “the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles.” Although subsequently denied by White House and Pentagon officials, the revelation arrives amidst continued threats and posturing by the Hermit kingdom to launch attacks against the United States and South Korea. However, while bellicose threats are being carelessly traded by both sides and eagerly regurgitated by the mainstream media, the question of how exactly North Korea acquired its nuclear capability in the first place has been completely ignored.

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations played a key role in helping the late Kim Jong-Il develop North Korea’s nuclear prowess from the mid 1990’s onwards. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presided over a $200 million dollar contract to deliver equipment and services to build two light water reactor stations in North Korea in January 2000 when he was an executive director of ABB (Asea Brown Boveri).

Wolfram Eberhardt, a spokesman for ABB confirmed that Rumsfeld was at nearly all the board meetings during his involvement with the company. Rumsfeld was merely picking up the baton from the Clinton administration, who in 1994 agreed to replace North Korea’s domestically built nuclear reactors with light water nuclear reactors. Clinton policy wonks claimed that light water reactors couldn’t be used to make bombs.

Not so according to Henry Sokolski, head of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, who stated, “LWRs could be used to produce dozens of bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium in both North Korea and Iran. This is true of all LWRs — a depressing fact U.S. policymakers have managed to block out.” “These reactors are like all reactors, they have the potential to make weapons.

So you might end up supplying the worst nuclear violator with the means to acquire the very weapons we’re trying to prevent it acquiring,” said Sokolski. The U.S. State Department claimed that the light water reactors could not be used to produce bomb grade material and yet in 2002 urged Russia to end its nuclear co-operation with Iran for the reason that it didn’t want Iran armed with weapons of mass destruction.

At the time, Russia was building light water reactors in Iran. According to the State Department, light water reactors in Iran can produce nuclear material but somehow the same rule doesn’t apply in North Korea. In April 2002, the Bush administration announced that it would release $95 million of American taxpayer’s dollars to begin construction of the ‘harmless’ light water reactors in North Korea.

Bush argued that arming the megalomaniac dictator Kim Jong-Il with the potential to produce a hundred nukes a year was, “vital to the national security interests of the United States.” Bush released even more money for the same purpose in January 2003. Bush released the funds despite the startling revelation, reported by South Korean newspapers, that a North Korean missile warhead had been found in Alaska.

Construction of the reactors was eventually suspended, but North Korea had an alternative source through which they could obtain the nuclear secrets vital to building an atom bomb arsenal – CIA asset and international arms smuggler AQ Khan. In 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atom bomb program, admitted sharing nuclear technology via a worldwide smuggling network that included facilities in Malaysia which manufactured key parts for centrifuges.

Khan’s collaborator B.S.A. Tahir ran a front company out of Dubai that shipped centrifuge components to North Korea. Despite Dutch authorities being deeply suspicious of Khan’s activities as far back as 1975, the CIA prevented the Dutch from arresting him on two separate occasions. “The man was followed for almost ten years and obviously he was a serious problem. But again I was told that the secret services could handle it more effectively,” former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers said.

“The Hague did not have the final say in the matter. Washington did.” Lubbers stated that Khan was allowed to slip in and out of the Netherlands with the blessing of the CIA, eventually allowing him to become the “primary salesman of an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how,” according to George W. Bush himself, and sell nuclear secrets that allowed North Korea to build nuclear bombs.

“Lubbers suspects that Washington allowed Khan’s activities because Pakistan was a key ally in the fight against the Soviets,” reports CFP. “At the time, the US government funded and armed mujahideen such as Osama bin Laden. They were trained by Pakistani intelligence to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Anwar Iqbal, Washington correspondent for the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, told ISN Security Watch that Lubbers’ assertions may be correct.

“This was part of a long-term foolish strategy. The US knew Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons but couldn’t care less because it was not going to be used against them. It was a deterrent against India and possibly the Soviets.” In September 2005 it emerged that the Amsterdam court which sentenced Khan to four years imprisonment in 1983 had lost the legal files pertaining to the case. The court’s vice-president, Judge Anita Leeser, accused the CIA of stealing the files.

“Something is not right, we just don’t lose things like that,” she told Dutch news show NOVA. “I find it bewildering that people lose files with a political goal, especially if it is on request of the CIA. It is unheard of.” In 2005, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to North Korea. Through their policies in aiding North Korea to build light water reactors, and via the CIA asset AQ Khan who was protected at every step of the way while he helped provide North Korea with the means to build a nuclear arsenal, the U.

S. government itself was directly complicit in providing North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il and now his successor Kim Jong-un with the nuclear weapons that have now caused an international crisis with the Korean peninsula on the brink of war. Given the documented history of the United States’ role in arming North Korea with the very weapons the reclusive state is now threatening to use against Americans, the constant drumbeat of fearmongering by the US media about North Korea’s intentions is missing a huge part of the story.

********************* Paul Joseph Watson is the editor and writer for Infowars.com and Prison Planet.com. He is the author of Order Out Of Chaos. Watson is also a host for Infowars Nightly News.

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How can an otherwise failed dictatorship best suppress internal dissent while winning international attention, influence — and money? Apparently, it must openly seek nuclear weapons. Second, the nut state should sound so crazy and unpredictable that it might just use them, regardless of civilization’s deterrent forces arrayed against it. Third, it must welcome being “reluctantly” pulled into nonproliferation talks to prolong the farce and allow its deep-pocket enemies to brag of their diplomatic “strategic patience” and sophistication.

The accepted logic of the rogue state is that the Westernized world is so affluent and leisured, and life is so good, that it will understandably grant almost any immediate geostrategic or monetary concession to avoid serious disruptions of the international order. The logic of appeasement is always more appeasement — especially in the one-bomb nuclear age. North Korea sounds as if Pyongyang is an expendable hellhole, but not so Seoul, one of the world’s great commercial and industrial powerhouses that exports Hyundais, Kias, Samsung, and LG appliances.

The logic is that of the proverbial crazy country neighbor, whose house and yard are a junkyard mess, whose kids are criminals, and who periodically threatens to “mess you up” unless you put up with his antics, give him attention, and overlook his serial criminality. The renegade neighbor’s logic is that you have lots to lose by descending into his world of violence and insanity, while he has nothing to forfeit by basking in it, and that such asymmetry allows him to have something on you.

And it makes him something other than just the ex-con, creep, and failure that he otherwise is. Short-term appeasement of unhinged monsters is always felt to be a safer and less dangerous choice than solving the problem once and for all, which one might do by calling the bluff of a rabid entity believed capable of inflicting grave damage on the civilized order. And so for nearly the last half century we have found new and creative ways of feeding our pre-civilized dragons in fear that otherwise they will immediately scorch civilization.

The logic, in other words, has been “let the next administration handle this temporarily placated monster when he gets hungry again.” For nearly the last half century, the logic has been ‘let the next administration handle this temporarily placated monster when he gets hungry again.’ For much of the 1980s and 1990s, Saddam Hussein sounded and acted murderously unhinged: He preemptively attacked Iran, issued threats against most of his neighbors, gassed thousands of Kurds at Halabja, bragged about his human flesh-chipper, ran a gestapo police state that murdered hundreds of thousands of its own, invaded Kuwait, sent missiles into Israel, violated U.

N. resolutions, and all the while slyly suggesting that Iraq had a huge arsenal of WMD. A crazy, dangerous Iraq was all over the front pages — in a way that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and other oil-exporting Arab countries were not. But eventually Saddam’s various enemies concluded that in fact he did not have nuclear capability, and then they moved to ensure that he never acquired it. After Israel’s preemptive strike in 1981 at the Iraq nuclear facility at Osirak, outside of Baghdad, and the crushing defeat in the First Gulf War, Saddam’s enemies guessed that he had no nuclear deterrent — yet.

And so the Americans took him out in 2003, on the hunch that his much-bragged-about WMD arsenal did not mean he had a bomb. Moammar Qaddafi adopted the same blueprint of acting crazy — subsidizing global terrorists, taking down airplanes, terrorizing his own people — while using his petrodollars to build centrifuges to acquire nuclear capability. For a time, Qaddafi was on the world stage in a way that nondescript Morocco or Tunisia was not.

But after the 2003 removal of Saddam, Qaddafi panicked, feared his own removal, and so gave up his nuclear program. Without nukes and a future deterrent, his craziness eventually sounded shrill and he was bombed out of power less than a decade later. Iran follows the same tired and predictable script. It has talked grandly of Israel as a “one-bomb state.” It threatens to unleash a firestorm in the Persian Gulf.

It sends out global terrorists and fights proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. It hijacks boats and gloats about launching missiles toward American carriers. Iran’s revolutionary theocracy has executed thousands of dissidents; it takes Western hostages and bargains for ransom. And all the while it has continued to build centrifuges — now bragging that it will soon become nuclear, now backing off under criticism and smirking that its enriched uranium is “for peaceful purposes” only.

In other words, a passive-aggressive Iran learned long ago that an otherwise nondescript rogue nation without an effective military and economy, or cultural influence of the caliber of the United States’, Europe’s, Russia’s, or China’s, usually does not warrant world attention. It does not win $400 million in bribe money in the dead of night along with fawning, serial concessions — unless it credibly acts as if it is both nuts and on the cusp of being nuclear.

So Iran, in seemingly suicidal fashion, poses as if it is existentially dangerous, neither subject to natural laws of deterrence nor to international norms and laws. (Few worry about democratic and nuclear France, India, and Israel or even much about Russia and China, both of which are autocratic and nuclear but otherwise globalized, commercially engaged, and usually predictable.) In contrast, consider Pakistan.

Periodically it has talked of nuclear exchanges with India, winked and nodded at terrorist operations against Mumbai, harbored bin Laden, promoted the Taliban, and profited from terrorism and drugs — on the loud assurance that it has a sizable nuclear arsenal, is unpredictable, and at times is prone to suicidal Islamist fantasies. Without such a strategy, Pakistan would earn little fear, no world attention, and not much international aid, given that it has never developed a sophisticated globalized economy like neighboring democratic India.

Pyongyang has gained billions in bribe money, international attention and concern, and free publicity, despite starving its own people and becoming the hated pariah of Asia. But no one has played the game better than the two Kim Jongs of North Korea. The result is that Pyongyang has gained billions in bribe money, international attention and concern, and free publicity, despite starving its own people and becoming the hated pariah of Asia.

Certainly, comparably sized Asian countries such as Sri Lanka or Malaysia do not warrant the world’s focus or largesse by quietly tending to their own business. Under the rules of nuttiness and nuclearized blackmail, quiet non-nuclear states who play by the rules are ignored, and rogues who don’t are courted and bribed. Outlaw leaders see such brinkmanship as the pathway to family enrichment and prolonged tenure.

There are still a few ways to break this dangerous cycle, but they all are predicated on two assumptions: the immediate remedies are quite dangerous, and yet the status quo is not sustainable and even more existentially dangerous in the long term. Here are some options; they are not mutually exclusive and universally applicable to rogue nuclear states besides North Korea. Third Parties Rogue nations exist because superpower patrons find them useful pawns.

Trump apparently is redefining Obama-era “normal” commercial relations with China as suddenly asymmetrical and detrimental to the U.S. — as a bargaining chip to negotiate downward so that the Chinese will help with North Korea. If in exchange he gets Chinese pressure on Pyongyang, then the upside of the deal is that we are no worse off trade-wise with China than we were in 2009, but much better off without a North Korea threat.

It’s usually delusional to appeal to the self-interest of a big power that is sponsoring a rogue state (a Russia or a China knows better than we do why their clients do things that bother us). Yet Trump apparently will try to convince China (no longer itself posing as a Maoist-crazy, impoverished nuclear state) that a rich South Korea that forgoes nuclear weapons, with traditional rivalries with Japan, is still a better deal than a serially unpredictable and treacherous nuclear Pyongyang, whose wayward nuclear explosions could radiate almost anywhere.

Sanctions We laugh at soft-power sanctions. But in the case of North Korea and Iran, it was they, not us, who lobbied, threatened, and begged for them to end. The problem with sanctions is not that they do not eventually work but that that they take a long time to work well — and in the interim the sanctioneers lose their nerve and their solidarity and then capitulate, either to win accolades for a “legacy” deal or in guilt that they have reduced North Koreans to eating grass or Iranians to being without Advil.

Once sanctions are leveled, they should never be lifted until the rogue state is certifiably incapable of deploying nuclear weapons. Deterrence Rogue nations do not care about offensive asymmetry, given their vows that they welcome Armageddon if it means the end of an American city or chaos in the supposedly hated West. In such an unlikely but nevertheless dangerous calculus, ten nukes in the hand of Iran or North Korea are felt to be worth 1,000 in the possession of the U.

S. So the key is more defensive deterrence, or the overwhelming assurance that missile defense, cyberwarfare, etc. can nearly guarantee that North Korea’s weapons will have zero effect on its enemies. The script about desiring suicide is empty if a rogue state knows it cannot take anyone down with it (like a suicide bomber who beforehand knows that his bomb is a dud). Clearly, the U.S. and its Asian allies must expand — and demonstrate — their anti-missile capability as fast as possible.

Degrees of Madness Rogue madness can become banal quickly. (“My, my — North Korea threatened to blow us up again yesterday.”) North Korea can only threaten to incinerate the U.S. so many times; Iran can put out only so many videos showing America in flames. Western madness is a different story, given its rarity and far more likely severity. It is a false reading of history to think that the U.

S. has always responded predictably and proportionally. Its record in the World Wars and Korea and Vietnam is on occasion devastating and disproportionate. We ridicule the good cop–bad cop, Nixonian-Kissingerian role-playing, but it achieved results precisely because there were unquestionably credible hawks in government who were always on the verge of breaking out of their cages. The loud presence of a supposedly Strangelovian Curtis LeMay was of value to U.

S. presidents. The occasional narrative, true or fabricated, that a sober McMaster or Mattis must calm down an impulsive Trump may have some value. Allied Cohesion In a showdown, there can be no triangulating allies who publicly fret about America’s “show of force” but privately beg that it continues. The key is to separate rogue states from their patrons, not our clients from ourselves. Any policy must first be ironclad in its assurances that all frontline threatened states are on board with a new deterrent stature and not sending mixing signals to enemies.

The alignment of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia with the U.S. is a potent force that can help sway China and reassure such non-nuclear states that they are under the American defensive umbrella. Brinkmanship As a last resort, of course, the U.S. can always tell China that it broke the unspoken rule of not letting a client go nuclear. It will remind Beijing that if Taiwan, Japan, or South Korea chooses to go nuclear as did North Korea, its nukes would work like Hondas and Kias and not implode on the launching pad.

Public opinion in all these countries, of course, understandably opposes nuclearization, but public opinion is fickle when North Korea sends missiles into one’s air space. Nuclearized India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea on the borders of Russia and China are unstable enough for these patrons — without adding a nearby nuclear Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea as well. In sum, when a nutty nuclear or would-be nuclear state goes too far in its various extortions and is seen as an immediate existential threat, then long-term dangers become short-term crises and override short-term appeasement.

And that’s where we seem to be going with North Korea. — NRO contributor Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won, to appear in October from Basic Books. READ MORE:

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